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Abstract
Traffic lights are a common instrument to regulate
the traffic in junctions. However, when a vehicle
has an urgency, it may violate the traffic lights.
Since the other vehicles do not expect this, such vi-
olations lead to road accidents. Connected and au-
tonomous vehicles can coordinate their actions and
decide on the priority of passing without the need
of traffic lights if they can share information about
their current situation. That is, a vehicle with an ur-
gency can communicate this with justifications to
others and ask to go first. However, the shared in-
formation can potentially yield privacy violations
while helping vehicles attain priority. We propose a
privacy-preserving decision making framework for
managing traffic at junctions. The vehicles are rep-
resented as autonomous agents that can communi-
cate with each other and make priority-based deci-
sions using auctions. The bids in the auctions are
not monetary but contain information that each ve-
hicle is willing to declare. Our experiments on real-
world accident data show that our proposed bidding
strategies help vehicles preserve their privacy while
still enabling them to receive priority at junctions.
1 Introduction
Traffic accidents are the leading cause of casualties in many
countries. Only in US, approximately 40,000 people died in
traffic accidents in 2016 [National Safety Council, 2016] and
millions of people have been injured. Most of these acci-
dents happen because human drivers do not obey traffic rules,
or are not aware of the physical conditions of the environ-
ment. Autonomous vehicles are expected to reverse this as
they can be designed to follow the rules more strictly than
human drivers [Crew, 2015]. However, human drivers also
choose to violate the rules on purpose to address their own
needs. For example, a driver can choose not to stop at a red
light at a junction because of a special condition; i.e., she
is in a hurry because of a sick passenger. In many occa-
sions, if the other drivers were aware of the situation, they
might accommodate it, for example by lending the road to
that driver. This is widely seen in case of a fire truck or an
ambulance, where the vehicles physically show their purpose
through sound and colors. However, with regular cars, there
are no special symbols that can designate their purpose. Thus,
in junctions, the decision making is done in a simple turn-
taking manner that treats every vehicle equally. Ideally, it
would be best if the vehicles could communicate with each
other about their emergencies or constraints [Atherton, 2016]
and automatically reach a decision as to which one should go
first. Recent technologies, such as Vehicle-to-X (V2X) make
it possible for vehicles to talk to each other as well as des-
ignated entities on a road [Lu et al., 2014]. Using such a
technology, vehicles could communicate information such as
the purpose of their trip, physical conditions of the vehicle as
well as the external properties of the environment.
While such a communication between autonomous vehi-
cles could serve to reach a decision, it could also create im-
portant privacy challenges. For example, a vehicle could re-
veal that it is in an emergency because it is carrying the presi-
dent and might actually end up passing through a junction be-
fore others, but disclosing this information could create other
threats for the vehicle. Or, a stroke patient who has high blood
pressure symptoms could be in hurry to go to hospital. How-
ever, he might prefer not sharing his health condition with
other entities because the breach of this information can lead
to loss of insurance or a job. Thus, preserving privacy of the
vehicles while reaching a decision is of utmost importance.
This paper proposes an agent-based approach to realize
privacy-preserving decision making for autonomous vehi-
cles [Bazzan and Klugl, 2014]. Whenever two vehicles are at
a junction, the vehicles bid with their information in an auc-
tion to decide which vehicle will go first. The vehicle whose
bid yields a higher priority gets to pass before the other. Con-
trary to traditional auctions with monetary bids, here even
when a bid does not win the auction, the bidder is at a loss
because some information has been disclosed. To handle this,
we propose bidding strategies where each vehicle bids incre-
mentally so that private information is only revealed if it will
help the vehicle in taking a priority. As a result, a vehicle
that provides enough information to convince the intersection
manager for its priority passes first. This enables the vehicles
to preserve their privacy while reporting their situation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 in-
troduces a multiagent model where each autonomous vehicle
is represented as an agent that uses auctions to make priority-
based decisions. We explain various parameters and condi-
Property Property Weight Instance Instance Weight
Vehicle Type (t) 0.25
Ambulance 1.0
Car 0.9
Taxi 0.9
Journey of Purpose (p) 0.25
Journey as part of work 1.0
Commuting to/from work 0.8
Riding to/from school 0.8
Age Band of Driver (b) 0.25 0-5, 6-10, 66-75, 75+ 0.8
11-65 1.0
Age of Vehicle (a) 0.25 Numeric Value (0-105) 1.0
Table 1: An Example Set of Properties and Instances
tions that cause accidents. Section 3 develops our approach
and bidding strategies. Section 4 evaluates the approach on
real word accident data. Section 5 provides a discussion on
relevant approaches for junction managements. Finally, Sec-
tion 6 concludes with directions for future research.
2 Autonomous Vehicles as a Multiagent
System
We propose an agent-based approach where each agent repre-
sents an autonomous vehicle [Chen and Cheng, 2010]. Each
agent is aware of the properties that are associated with the
vehicle and the journey, such as the purpose of the trip or
the type of the vehicle. When they arrive at a junction, they
need to reach a decision as to which vehicle will pass first.
To do so, each vehicle can put forward its current status to
convince other vehicles of its priority. In order to be able to
compare the status of two different vehicles, it is best if the
information can be transformed into a single priority value.
However, if each vehicle computes this value for itself, there
is no guarantee that they would report it correctly; i.e., each
vehicle can report a high priority value to pass first. To over-
come this, it is best if both vehicles can report information
about their status and a mediator can compute the priority val-
ues and announce the decision. Such an entity can have fur-
ther information about the environment and compute a prior-
ity value. Auctions serve as an ideal mechanism for decision
making through a mediator, where the entities involved (e.g.,
autonomous vehicles) express their priorities independently.
The general idea is that an auctioneer provides a service (e.g.,
selling an item) and wants to get the highest possible price.
On the other hand, the potential bidders want to receive ser-
vice at the lowest possible price [Weiss, 1999]. For example,
in an English auction, the buyer with the highest bid wins an
auction and gets the item.
Auctions have been studied before in the context of deci-
sion making for autonomous vehicles at junctions and have
been shown to reduce delays significantly [Carlino et al.,
2013]. In that approach, autonomous vehicles bid money to
measure the value of a trip in terms of the value of time. Ac-
cording to the result of the auction, the driver can cross the in-
tersection or wait. In our work, the bids consist of properties,
and the value of a bid is computed by a trusted Intersection
Manager (IM) who acts as the auctioneer. Each vehicle bids
with information and based on the type of the auction, IM de-
cides on the winner of the auction. The bidder that provides
information with the highest priority value wins. Contrary to
existing work, the autonomous vehicles bid information in-
stead of money to preserve privacy. We assume that the IM
represents an authoritative entity, such as traffic patrol and
is equipped with the necessary security techniques to collect,
save, and process the bids without compromise.
The auctions that have been used before have not taken into
consideration the privacy of the autonomous vehicles. Since
the vehicles are giving away information as their bids to re-
flect their situation, it could very well be that the information
they provide contain sensitive information. Thus, it is neces-
sary to account for privacy in handling decision making.
2.1 Understanding Accidents
To understand road accidents better, we have analyzed the
Road Safety Data [The UK Government, 2016] published
by the UK Government. This dataset contains more than
140,000 road accidents with numerous properties including
details about the consequential casualties. We show a repre-
sentative subset in Table 1.
Each property has a name and a sample set of instances.
The first property is the Vehicle Type with instances of ambu-
lance, car and taxi. We associate an instance weight that de-
notes the importance of each instance. A regular car usually
gives priority to an ambulance, which gets a higher instance
weight. The second property is the Journey of Purpose. For
example, a car can be in a hurry because it is late for school.
The third property is the Age Band of the Driver. For exam-
ple, a vehicle may need to pass first because it has an older
driver. The fourth property is the Age of a Vehicle, a value
between 0 and 105. Older vehicles may have brakes that are
not robust and thus may be preferred to lead the road to a
high-speed car. As seen in Table 1, some properties are about
the vehicle itself (e.g., vehicle type), whereas some proper-
ties give information about the passengers in the vehicle (e.g.,
journey of purpose).
In addition to the instances of properties, properties them-
selves can be associated a weight, to denote that one aspect
of the vehicle is more important than a second one. The val-
ues in this table can be adjusted. Here, we assume that each
Vehicle Type (t) Purpose of Journey (p) Age Band of Driver (b) Age of Vehicle (a)
Vehicle 1 (V1) CAR SCHOOL 6 9
[0.76] [0.885] [0.15] [0.452]
Vehicle 2 (V2) TAXI PARTOFWORK 9 5
[0.477] [0.879] [0.334] [0.948]
Table 2: Properties for the Two Vehicles in Accident Number 2015331500103
property is equally important and thus assign a value of 0.25.
Running Example. A taxi and a car meet at a junction,
where the car is headed for school and the taxi for work. How
to decide which vehicle will pass first?
The vehicles (V1 and V2) have the properties specified in
Table 2 with different privacy values, which will be detailed
in Section 3. The age band of driver values of the vehicles
are 6 and 9 respectively; the age of the vehicle V1 is 9 and
the age of the vehicle V2 is 5. An immediate question is how
the vehicles will generate the bids regarding the properties of
the vehicles. We study three strategies that vary in how they
preserve privacy.
2.2 Strategy 1: Bid-All.
The simplest strategy is when the vehicles decide to reveal
all their properties in their bids. This type of strategy corre-
sponds to the Blind auction, where each bidder places a bid
without considering the bids of others. The auctioneer an-
nounces the highest bidder who pays the amount of his bid.
The Intersection Manager (IM) should make a decision to
compute a priority value for the received bids, and let the ve-
hicle with the highest priority value to move first at the junc-
tion. Note that the priority values can be computed in dif-
ferent ways; we propose one such priority function in Equa-
tion 1. uv is the priority value of the vehicle v. All the shared
properties of a vehicle are added to the computation of the
priority value. wp is the weight of the property p and wp.i is
the weight for the instance of the property p.
uv =
∑
(wp ∗ wp.i) (1)
Figure 1 shows the interactions of two vehicles with IM,
when the vehicles employ different bidding strategies. The
dotted circles and the dotted squares show the possible bids
of the two vehicles V1 and V2. The winner of the auction has
an underlined label. The first two strategies are single-shot
auctions; whereas the third strategy requires multiple interac-
tions with the IM.
In Figure 1a, when the vehicles follow Bid-All strategy, the
two vehicles share all their properties (t, p, b, a). According
to Equation 1, IM computes the priority values as 0.875 and
0.925 for V1 and V2 respectively. V2 is the vehicle with the
highest priority value; hence, it wins the auction and moves
first. This strategy is blind to privacy since all relevant infor-
mation is shared without a privacy consideration.
3 Privacy-aware Strategies
A vehicle that is willing to share most of its properties might
be in an urgent situation. However, there is a privacy tradeoff
to consider, since a vehicle may choose to keep some proper-
ties private to preserve its privacy instead of moving first. On
the other hand, there is no guarantee that a vehicle will get the
priority if it shares all its shareable properties. Recall that a
vehicle only reveals its properties to the IM, which leads the
auction and makes the decision about the winner.
To preserve privacy, each vehicle needs to prioritise its
properties according to their privacy needs. Each property
in Table 1 can be shared by a vehicle, if it meets the privacy
needs of that vehicle. First, a vehicle assigns a privacy value
for each property between 0 and 1. This value shows how
much a property is private for the vehicle. In Table 2, the pri-
vacy values for each property are specified in brackets. For
example, the vehicle type property has a privacy value of 0.76
for V1. Second, a vehicle sets a single privacy threshold value
between 0 and 1. A vehicle can only share a property with
other IM entities if the privacy value of that property is below
or equal to its threshold. We call such properties shareable
properties. According to Table 2 and Figure 1, if the privacy
threshold is set to 0.8 for both of the vehicles, the shareable
properties of V1 are {t, b, a}; and those of V2 are {t, b}. A
shareable property is a candidate property that can be shared.
In other words, a vehicle can decide which shareable property
to reveal according to the privacy-aware strategy that it em-
ploys. In the following, we propose two such privacy-aware
strategies.
3.1 Strategy 2: Bid-Privacy-Aware
A privacy-aware strategy would be when the vehicles decide
to reveal only all or some of their shareable properties. Bid-
Privacy-Aware (BPA) strategy again corresponds to the Blind
auction, but this time the vehicles place a privacy-preserving
bid and share some of their shareable properties.
In Figure 1b, the shareable properties of V1 are {t, b, a};
whereas V2 can share from {t, b}. When the vehicles fol-
low the BPA strategy, IM collects the shareable properties
of V1 and V2. It computes the priority values as 0.675 and
0.425 (Equation 1). V1 wins the auction with the highest pri-
ority value. In the Bid-All strategy, V2 was the winner when
it shared all its properties. In the BPA strategy, V2 lost the
auction since it preferred not to share some of its properties.
In other words, V2 chose to preserve its privacy by revealing
some of its shareable properties. This is a prime example that
depicts that vehicles might value their privacy more than the
utility they will gain by revealing private information.
3.2 Strategy 3: Bid-Privacy-Incremental
The vehicles could decide when to make a bid regarding what
properties they could share. If they knew that they would not
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Figure 1: Bidding strategies applied on the running example (Accident Number 2015331500103). The privacy threshold is set to 0.8.
place a higher bid, they could choose not to place a new bid
to preserve their privacy. In Bid-Privacy-Incremental (BPI)
strategy, each time that IM is waiting for new bids from the
vehicles, it broadcasts the priority value of the current high-
est bid. The auction continues with the vehicles that can raise
the highest bid. In this strategy, the vehicles are free to leave
an auction if they cannot beat the current highest bid. Differ-
ent from the previous strategies, the auction may terminate in
several iterations. As before, the vehicle placing the highest
bid gets the priority in traffic. This strategy corresponds into
an English auction.
Assume that V1 is the first vehicle that communicates with
the IM. In Figure 1c, V1 places a bid that consists of b in the
first iteration. Note that in previous strategies, V1 revealed
all its shareable properties. Then, IM computes the priority
value of the received bid that is 0.2. IM asks V2 to place a
new bid and announces the current priority value. V2 places
a bid that consists of b. IM computes the priority value of the
received bid that is 0.2. IM asks V1 to place a new bid that
values more than 0.2. V1 makes a bid that consists of a. IM
computes the current priority value as 0.45. V2 is not able
to make a better bid since the only property that it can share
is t. In such case, its priority value would become 0.425,
which is less than the V1’s bid value. V2 leaves the auction
without placing a new bid, and chooses to keep the property t
private. Compared to Bid-Privacy-Aware strategy, the privacy
loss for V1 and V2 is minimized. V1 wins the auction by only
disclosing b and a; V2 loses the auction by only sharing b.
This strategy cannot change the outcome of an auction where
the vehicles follow Bid-Privacy-Aware strategy. However, it
can help the vehicles to disclose their shareable properties
minimally as shown in this particular example.
4 Evaluation
So far we have introduced three strategies: Bid-All, Bid-
Privacy-Aware and Bid-Privacy-Incremental. The first strat-
egy does not consider any privacy concerns of the agents in-
volved in an auction. However, the other two strategies can
be employed by the agents to preserve their privacy. In this
section, we first introduce a privacy loss metric and we show
how this metric would be applied to our running example. By
using a real-world dataset, we report the privacy loss results
when the agents employ various strategies for different pri-
vacy thresholds.
4.1 The Privacy Loss Metric
In auctions, the vehicles put their bids by revealing all or
some of their properties. However, revealing a property re-
sults in privacy loss. In Equation 2, we introduce a metric to
measure the privacy loss of a vehicle. PLv is the privacy loss
value for the vehicle v. The privacy loss is basically the ratio
of the privacy value of shared properties per the privacy value
of all properties. In this equation, K is the number of shared
properties provided by v, N is the number of total proper-
ties and Pk is the privacy value of the kth property chosen by
v. In this work, N is set to four as we refer to the auction
properties described in Table 1.
PLv =
K∑
k=1
Pk
N∑
k=1
Pk
∗ 100 (2)
In Table 2, for each vehicle, the privacy values of the prop-
erties are shown. The total privacy value of V1 is 2.247 (i.e.,
the sum of all the privacy values); whereas V2’s total privacy
value is 2.638. To compare the different strategies, we refer
to Figure 1. In Table 3, we report the privacy loss results of
V1 and V2 when the vehicles employ different strategies. In
Bid-All strategy, the privacy value of shared properties (the
lost privacy value) is equal to the total privacy. Hence, the
privacy loss is 100% for both of the vehicles. Recall that
the privacy threshold value is set to 0.8 for the running ex-
ample. In Bid-Privacy-Aware strategy, for V1, the journey of
purpose (p) is not shared, then the lost privacy value becomes
1.362. According to Equation 2, the privacy loss is computed
as 136.2/2.247 = 60.62%. In a similar way, the privacy value
for V2 is computed as 30.74% (i.e., the properties t and b
are shared). In Bid-Privacy-Incremental strategy, for V1 the
properties b and a are shared, and the privacy loss becomes
26.79%. For V2, b is the only shared property and the privacy
loss becomes 12.66%. If we look at the privacy-aware strate-
gies, both vehicles preserve their privacy better when they
win or lose the auctions that they are involved in. For ex-
ample, when both vehicles employ Bid-Privacy-Incremental
strategy, V2 loses the auction by only revealing one property,
which results in a low privacy loss value.
th=0.8 PLv1 PLv2
Bid-All 100% 100%
Bid-Privacy-Aware 60.62% 30.74%
Bid-Privacy-Incremental 26.79% 12.66%
Table 3: Privacy loss results for the two vehicles
4.2 Results
We use the Road Safety Data [The UK Government, 2016]
with the auction properties discussed in Table 1 and create
a real-world multiagent environment. We focus on the road
accidents that occurred between two vehicles at junctions.
There are 4563 road accidents where complete information
about the vehicles and their properties have been revealed.
We developed a Java-based simulation environment that
can represent the accidents that are of interest from the
dataset. In our work, we have focused on accidents that have
all the properties reported for the vehicles. The dataset is
split into databases and collections, which are stored in Mon-
goDB1. Our developed system can represent agents with var-
ious settings and test different auction strategies to see how
1https://www.mongodb.com/
well they help preserve the privacy of autonomous vehicles.
In each imported accident, there are two vehicles, which are
the vehicle agents in the simulation. Our program reports
the privacy loss results for each agent, and it makes use of
MongoDB to store the experiment results for different pri-
vacy thresholds. Our implementation is available online at
our GitHub page2.
For each accident, we generate two vehicle agents from
the dataset and one IM agent. Each vehicle agent represents
a vehicle involved in the accident from the dataset, and is
equipped with the four auction properties (see Table 1). The
dataset does not contain any privacy values for such proper-
ties. Therefore, the privacy value for each property is gener-
ated randomly, each privacy value is a uniformly distributed
double value between 0 and 1. Note that these privacy values
are only generated once and used throughout the experiments.
For each accident in the dataset, the IM agent starts an
auction with the vehicle agents, where both vehicle agents
use either Bid-All (BA), Bid-Privacy-Aware (BPA) or Bid-
Privacy-Incremental (BPI) strategy. In Bid-All strategy, a
vehicle shares all its properties, leading to a privacy loss of
100% at all times. In privacy-aware strategies, the privacy
loss depends on the privacy threshold of the vehicle. If the
vehicle is in an urgent situation, it can choose a high pri-
vacy threshold to move first at the junction by sharing most
of its properties. To observe such variations, we run our ex-
periments with different privacy thresholds: 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.8
and 0.9. For each accident, a privacy loss value is computed
per vehicle according to the metric in Equation 2. Hence,
we can also compute the average privacy loss value of both
vehicles involved in an accident. For the accident number
2015331500103, the generated privacy values are shown in
Table 2. We report the privacy loss results for this accident in
Figure 2 when the vehicles employ privacy-aware strategies.
The privacy loss values are the same for both strategies when
the privacy threshold is 0.3. When this threshold is one of
0.5, 0.7 and 0.8, we observe that the privacy loss of Vehicle 2
is less (12.66%) when it uses Bid-Privacy-Incremental strat-
egy. Similarly, when the privacy threshold is 0.9, the privacy
loss values are minimized for both vehicles when they pre-
fer using Bid-Privacy-Incremental strategy instead of Bid-All
and Bid-Privacy-Aware strategies. The main reason for this
is that the vehicles do not disclose their shareable properties
if they realize that they cannot place a better bid.
0.3 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.9
BA 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
BPA 11.84% 30.1% 54.46% 68.73% 83.98%
BPI 7.01% 20.57% 42.87% 58.19% 76.2%
Table 4: Average privacy loss results when the privacy threshold is
set to different values
In Table 4, we report the average privacy loss results of
4563 road accidents from the dataset. We observe that Bid-
2https://github.com/PrivacyInInternetOfThings/
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Figure 2: The Privacy Loss of the Vehicles in Accident Number 2015331500103 with different strategies and privacy thresholds. The privacy
loss of Vehicle 1, Vehicle 2 and their average are denoted as PL1, PL2 and AvgPL, respectively.
Privacy-Incremental strategy helps the vehicles to preserve
their privacy more in every case. When the vehicles prefer a
low privacy threshold value (i.e., the vehicles are conserva-
tive about privacy), their privacy is preserved more. For ex-
ample, when the privacy threshold is 0.3, the average privacy
loss is only about 7%. The privacy loss increases when the
vehicles decide to share most of their properties to pass first
at the junction. For example, when the privacy threshold is
0.8, the average privacy loss is 68.73% in Bid-Privacy-Aware
strategy. The vehicles can preserve their privacy better by
using Bid-Privacy-Incremental strategy. In that case, the pri-
vacy loss becomes 58.19%. As a result, vehicles that employ
Bid-Privacy-Incremental strategy achieve the same level of
success at passing at intersections, while they enjoy a higher
level of privacy.
5 Related Work
Agent-based approaches have been used to study traffic flow.
Through multiagent simulations, the effect of traffic jams or
speed limits have been studied. Doniec et al. [Doniec et al.,
2008] develop a multiagent model to study the traffic flow
at intersections. They represent the behavior of drivers with
rules, with an emphasis on capturing an opportunistic behav-
ior, where drivers may prefer to violate norms. Their evalu-
ation shows that their proposed behavior models capture real
life traffic flow better. In our approach, we facilitate the coor-
dination of agents based on their particular context and infor-
mation, which might be private. Our coordination mechanism
preserves the privacy of the vehicles as much as possible.
An alternative approach to coordinating traffic is to de-
sign intelligent traffic signaling. Choy et al. [Choy et al.,
2003] represent the signaling as a multiagent system, where
each agent is responsible for controlling an intersection. Each
agent employs a fuzzy-neural decision making module to in-
fluence the traffic policy. The agents learn over time how
they should produce the policies. They evaluate their ap-
proach on a large traffic network. On a similar line, Abdoos
et al. [Abdoos et al., 2014] develop an approach where traf-
fic signals are controlled hierarchically by agents that employ
Q-learning. Using tile coding, the approach is made to scale
even to large networks. Both approaches show that by agent-
based signaling, the total amount of time that vehicles stop
is reduced significantly. While the main idea of those ap-
proaches is to reduce overall traffic, our focus here is to en-
able urgent vehicles to express their situation and take prior-
ity. In doing so, we emphasize the fact that agents’ privacy
need to be preserved.
Intersection management has been studied extensively
from different angles [Lu et al., 2014]. Zohdy, Ka-
malanathsharma, and Rakha develop a tool called iCACC
to regulate and optimize autonomous vehicles through inter-
section [Zohdy et al., 2012]. They show that compared to
signal control iCACC can minimize delays and fuel usage.
Miculescu and Karaman propose a polling-systems-based al-
gorithm for autonomous vehicles to adjust their speeds when
they arrive in a traffic intersection [Miculescu and Karaman,
2016]. They show that no accidents happen when the road
length is above certain threshold. In our model, an inter-
section manager collects information provided by the vehi-
cles to compute their priority values; accordingly, it coordi-
nates the traffic. Dresner and Stone propose a mechanism
for coordinating autonomous vehicles at intersections based
on information such as time of arrival and vehicle character-
istics [Dresner and Stone, 2008]. Similarly, they use an in-
tersection manager that grants or rejects the requests of the
vehicles and give priority to emergency vehicles such as am-
bulances. However, in our model, we assume that each ve-
hicle can communicate with the intersection manager private
information. Another well-known work on intersection man-
agement is that of Virtual Traffic Lights [Ferreira et al., 2010],
where the vehicles that approach an intersection first choose a
leader, who then creates a virtual signal using predefined rules
based on the observable data that the vehicles communicate
such as their speed and location. However, in our approach,
we also consider the sensitive information of the passengers
in the vehicle as well. Hence, we want to consider the par-
ticular situation in the vehicle (e.g., a patient in the vehicle).
While all discussed approaches are important, they do not ex-
plicitly consider the privacy of the autonomous vehicles.
Some approaches focus on using auctions to solve trans-
portation problems in a multiagent setting. Seshadri et al. al-
leviate the traffic congestion and propose a multiagent system
for reducing the node pressure [Seshadri et al., 2017]. They
introduce a multi-unit combinatorial auctioning system to al-
locate the resources and re-route the vehicle agents. Each ve-
hicle submits a bid, which is a binary vector, to change its cur-
rent path if it wins the auction. In our work, a bid is not a nu-
meric value but it consists of piece(s) of information. Accord-
ing to the internal reasoning of the agent, the agent decides to
reveal some of its properties. The IM agent is the one that
gives a value to the bids (i.e., pieces of information received
from other agents), and makes a decision about which vehi-
cle gets the priority, according to its decision-making mech-
anism. Ito et al. propose a multiagent setting for common
value auctions [Ito et al., 2000]. Each agent is trying to pre-
dict an approximate market value of an item to avoid the win-
ner’s curse. Gerding et al. consider a market where the seller
employs a single second-price auction [Gerding et al., 2008].
Two types of bidders are involved in an auction. A global
bidder can bid in multiple auctions; whereas, a local bidder is
only allowed to bid only in a single auction. In this work, the
goal is to find the optimal bid (which is the value of an item)
under various settings.
6 Future Directions
Intersections can be managed effectively and safely when ve-
hicles can inform others about their situation. However, en-
suring the privacy of the entities are of utmost importance.
We show that privacy-preserving bidding strategies can both
help vehicles preserve their privacy while enabling intersec-
tions to be managed dynamically.
This work opens up interesting directions for research.
Here, we ran our experiments for specific settings. There are
more settings that we would like to work on as part of our
future work. For example, what would happen if each agent
employs a different strategy when they meet at a junction?
Or, would it be possible for them to collaborate independently
to abuse the system? Or, how our proposed strategies would
work if more than two vehicles meet at a junction? Or, how an
agent can choose a privacy threshold automatically according
to its previous auction results, the variables of its environ-
ment? In other words, a vehicle can learn how to bid better to
win the auctions by preserving its privacy at the same time.
In some cases, vehicles would need to move in groups (i.e.,
vehicle platoons) for various reasons; e.g., people in the vehi-
cles would be traveling together. This would require groups
to go into auctions, rather than the individual vehicles as we
have shown above. However, different vehicles in the group
could have different privacy concerns that might not have
been revealed even to the other vehicles in the group, requir-
ing extended mechanisms to be in place. As a motivating ex-
ample, consider this case: A vehicle v does not want to reveal
any of its properties because it wants to preserve its privacy.
Such a vehicle would lose all of the auctions since the other
vehicles would be winners by just sharing at least one prop-
erty. Now assume that the vehicle v is part of a group of
vehicles and it is ahead of an ambulance, which has a high
chance of getting priority at a junction. In such a case, v
could pass first without revealing any of its properties thanks
to the ambulance being the group leader. It would be interest-
ing to extend our approach to handle such cases and study it
on the Road Safety Data dataset to measure its applicability
and effect on possible delays.
Another important extension would be adding a seman-
tic layer to the auctions. Currently, each agent views vari-
ous dimensions of the information as private with a certain
weight and acts accordingly. However, it is important to
be able to capture what the privacy constraints of the vehi-
cles are semantically so that at different situations, the agents
can assign the privacy values based on environment, context,
and other available information [Ko¨kciyan and Yolum, 2016;
Ko¨kciyan and Yolum, 2017]. This would require the agent to
make inferences and decide based on that.
For our proposed approach to be applied in real life, many
underlying technologies need to be in place. For example, we
assume that each vehicle reports its bids to the IM and thus
IM is the only entity with this information. However, if at
the time of sharing, used communication technology results
in the information to reach third parties, there would be a vi-
olation of privacy. It would be interesting to use a test-bed
environment to realize the approach on actual vehicles using
existing communication technologies.
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